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ABSTRACT 
On 16 April 2016, a moment magnitude (Mw) 7.0 earthquake struck the Island of Kyushu, Japan. Two major 
foreshocks (Mw 6.2 and Mw 6.0) contributed to devastation in Kumamoto City, Mashiki Town and in the 
mountainous areas of the Mount Aso volcanic caldera. This report summarises geotechnical and geological 
aspects of the earthquakes that were observed during a field investigation conducted by the NZSEE Team in 
collaboration with Japanese engineers and researchers. Many houses and other buildings, roads,  riverbanks, 
and an earth dam, either on or adjacent to the surface fault rupture or projected fault trace, were severely 
damaged as a result of both the strong ground shaking and permanent ground displacement. In the Mount 
Aso volcanic caldera, traces of medium to large scale landslides and rock falls were frequently observed. A 
number of landslides impacted homes and infrastructure, and were reported to have killed at least 10 people 
out of the 69 confirmed deaths associated with the earthquake. In a few suburbs of Kumamoto City and in 
Mashiki Town, localised liquefaction took place, causing lateral spreading, differential settlements of the 
ground and riverbanks, sinking and tilting of buildings, foundation failures, cracks on roads, and disruption 
of water and sewage pipe networks. The overall effects from liquefaction related hazards appeared relatively 
minor compared to the damage caused by shaking, landslides and surface fault rupture. Based on the field 
survey, key findings are highlighted and recommendations to NZ engineering practice are made in the report. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Kyushu Region of Southern Japan was affected by a series 
of moment magnitude (Mw) 6 to 7 earthquakes during 14th-16th 
April 2016, followed by hundreds of aftershocks. These 
earthquakes, referred herein as the Kumamoto Earthquake 
Sequence, caused significant damage over a wide area, 
including Kumamoto City, Mashiki Town and the Mount Aso 
volcanic caldera, see Figure 1. 
The New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering 
(NZSEE) has a strategy to use targeted missions to learn from 
relevant earthquakes that happen around the world, and bring 
back learnings that can be applied to enhance earthquake 
engineering practice in New Zealand. The aim is to increase 
New Zealand’s resilience to earthquake hazards. 
NZSEE decided that there were valuable lessons to be learnt 
from the Kumamoto Earthquake Sequence, particularly in 
relation to ground damage from the earthquakes, and selected a 
four-member team of experienced geotechnical professionals 
with expertise in geotechnical engineering, engineering 
geology and associated research. The team comprised Dr 
Gabriele Chiaro (Team Leader), Gavin Alexander, 
Pathmanathan Brabhaharan and Dr Christopher Massey, who 
were on the ground between 7 and 14 May 2016. 
The NZSEE team members joined Japanese investigation teams 
comprising geotechnical engineers from the University of 
Tokyo and Osaka City University. This provided an invaluable 
learning experience, as it allowed rapid access to the sites of 
interest, enabled key geotechnical/geological information to be 
gathered (otherwise available only in Japanese), provided an 
opportunity for valuable technical discussions and permitted 
collection of soil samples for further geotechnical analyses. 
The survey trip was planned in a way that most of the relatively 
large geographical area that was severely affected by the 
earthquakes was able to be covered on the ground. This allowed 
the NZSEE team to observe and record the type and spatial 
distribution of the main hazards triggered by the earthquakes. 
Figure 2 shows the daily investigation routes taken and the main 
places of interest that were visited during the reconnaissance 
survey. The observations were made only three to four weeks 
after the main earthquakes, when the government and local 
authorities were still in the emergency response phase, but after 
the critical and traumatic phase where the injured and dead had 
been evacuated. Thus numerous earthquake impacts were 
observed first-hand by the team, before major repair work that 
would obliterate the evidence of damage from the earthquake. 
During the visit, it was not possible to arrange meetings with 
the relevant Japanese government officials. The team therefore 
is not aware of the specific details relating to the response of the 
government and local authorities to the disaster. 
This report provides a reconnaissance-level description of the 
types and extent of landslides and other ground damage 
 
 
triggered by the Kumamoto earthquakes of 14 to 16 April 2016, 
and the consequent damage to infrastructure and the built 
environment. Observations of the performance of the buildings 
and infrastructure in response to the strong ground shaking and 
associated ground damage also provided a unique opportunity 
to see how certain construction methods and materials 
performed. This report builds on the two previous “In-Country 
Reports” prepared by the team [1, 2] by describing in more 
detail the observations of earthquake ground damage made by 
the NZSEE team and discussing the relevance and implications 
Figure 1: Location of the three main earthquakes along with the main areas visited on the ground by the NZSEE team. 
The background shade model is based on the ASTER 30 m DEM. The location of the two active faults (taken from the 
geology map of Japan, Figure 6) with associated surface rupture during this earthquake sequence are also shown.  
Figure 2: Selected locations and areas visited by the NZSEE team (track logs) on the ground. The inset map is a 
smaller-scale view of the Minami Aso area, where much of the landslide and surface fault rupture hazards associated 




of these observations to New Zealand. The report also provides 
some discussion about the significance of the observations in 
the context of the potential for earthquake-induced ground 
damage and consequent damage to the built environment in 
New Zealand. Such observations can therefore help identify 
where similar hazards and impacts could occur in New Zealand, 
as well as provide insights on how to mitigate against such 
hazards.  
It should be noted that the observations and views expressed in 
this report are those of the NZSEE team. The team was helped 
greatly by Japanese colleagues to understand the background 
and context of the observed hazards and their impacts. 
However, the team’s findings are based primarily on field 
observations, supplemented by other information taken from 
published data and reports, news articles (available at the time 
of writing) and from discussions with Japanese colleagues.  
THE 2016 KUMAMOTO EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE 
The earthquake events 
The primary earthquakes associated with the 2016 Kumamoto 
Earthquake Sequence in Kumamoto Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan, 
comprised (based on US Geological Survey data [3]): 
 Mw 6.2 (MJMA 6.5) fore-shock at about 11.4 km depth, at 
21:26 (JST) on 14 April 2016, located on northern part of 
the Hinagu Fault zone; 
 Mw 6.0 (MJMA 6.4) fore-shock at about 6.7 km depth, at 
00:03 (JST) on 15 April 2016, located on northern part of 
the strike-slip (right lateral) Hinagu Fault zone; 
 Mw 7.0 (MJMA 7.3) earthquake (the largest earthquake) at 
about 12.4 km depth, at 01:25 (JST) on 16 April 2016, 
located on the Futagawa Fault zone. 
The local magnitudes MJMA are based on the Japanese 
Metrological Agency observations [4]. The locations of these 
earthquakes and the aftershocks that followed (up to 24 May 
2016) are shown on Figure 3. 
There were a number of aftershocks after the main earthquake 
on 16 April 2016, and some of these have been large (Mw > 5). 
The magnitudes of the earthquakes that occurred during the 
field visit were smaller than Mw 5.  
The focal mechanism associated with lateral strike-slip faulting 
and the relatively shallow depth of the hypocentres (7-12 km) 
played an important role on the severity and spatial distribution 
of damage in the affected areas. 
Location of major historical earthquakes that occurred in 
Kumamoto Prefecture are also shown in Figure 3, for 
completeness. The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake Sequence is 
the first series of damaging earthquakes to hit Kumamoto since 
1889 when the Mw 6.3 Kinpozan Earthquake destroyed 
hundreds of houses and parts of Kumamoto Castle, and killed 
20 people [5].  
Strong motion earthquake data 
Data from the Mw 7.0 earthquake collected by the JMA from 
their K-NET and KiK-NET strong motion network shows that 
the maximum horizontal peak ground acceleration (single 
component) of 1.18 g was recorded at station KMMH016 near 
Mashiki (Figure 4), approximately 7 km NE of the epicentre. 
The maximum vertical peak ground acceleration of 0.89 g was 
also recorded at station KMMH016. The subsurface shear-wave 
velocity profile for this station [6] indicates that the topmost 15 
m has a shear wave velocity less than 240 m/s suggesting the 
site would be the equivalent of a subsoil Class C site under 
Standards New Zealand NZS 1170.5 [7].  
Strong shaking was also recorded at stations between Mashiki 
and Mount Aso (Figure 4 and Table 1). The isoseismals of 
Modified Mercalli shaking Intensity (MMI) shown in Figure 4 
are based on the strong motion data from the K-NET and KiK-
NET stations and have been plotted by USGS Shake Map [3, 
6]. These show two main areas where shaking was greater than 
MMI 9 (IX). The larger of the two areas extends northeast from 
the Mw 7.0 earthquake epicentre, along the Futagawa Fault 
Figure 3: Location of the earthquakes, and their magnitude (Mw) taken from data published by the JMA [4]. Major 




towards Nishihara, and the smaller area extends northeast from 
the northeast tip of the Futagawa Fault. The areas of strong 
shaking may suggest fault directivity effects, and the strong 
shaking around the inner base of the Mt. Aso caldera may 
suggest basin effects. 
Most of the observed severe earthquake damage was confined 
within the MMI 9 isoseismal and along the Futagawa Fault, in 
the area where there was evidence of surface fault rupture, but 
where no strong motion stations were located. 
The three-component ground accelerations measured by the 
KiK-NET and K-NET strong motion stations at Mashiki Town 
(KMMH016) and Kumamoto City (KMM006) are shown in 
Figure 5. High vertical and horizontal accelerations were 
recorded by most of the KiK-NET and K-NET strong motion 
stations located in proximity to the main active faults in the 
Kumamoto Prefecture (Figure 4).  
Rainfall 
Kumamoto Prefecture is located on the Island of Kyushu, which 
is at the southern end of the Japanese archipelago. The climate 
is monsoonal, with relatively mild weather year round 
comprising wet summers (June to August with mean monthly 
rainfall of >300 mm) and mild but dryer winters (December to 
February with mean monthly rainfall of < 100 mm).  
The two main earthquakes were preceded by heavy rainfall a 
week before the events, and followed afterwards by heavy 
rainfall on 21st April 2016. These rainfall conditions are typical 
for this time of year, but may have contributed to the severity 




Table 1: Peak ground accelerations recorded at KiK-NET 
and K-NET strong motion stations in the epicentral region 
for the Mw 7.0 earthquake (16 April 2016) [6]. 
Station Peak ground accelerations (g) 
 NS EW UD 
KMMH016 0.67 1.18 0.89 
KMM006 0.84 0.63 0.55 
KMM009 0.79 0.65 0.19 
KMM011 0.61 0.61 0.26 
KMM005 0.54 0.49 0.41 
KMM007 0.28 0.43 0.31 
KMM004 0.27 0.35 0.27 
GEOLOGY AND GEOMORFOLOGY OF THE 
AFFECTED AREA 
The geology of the area is shown in Figure 6, which is taken 
from the 1:200,000 scale geology map produced by the 
Geological Society of Japan [9]. The volcanic rocks in the area 
around Minami Aso Township mainly comprise late 
Pleistocene non-alkaline felsic and mafic volcanic rocks, 
(ignimbrite, volcanic breccia and some basalt lava flows). 
Inside the caldera, most of the slopes are covered by volcanic 
pyroclastic soils (airfall deposits), ranging from a few metres to 
tens of metres in thickness. These soils are known to be 
sensitive to pore-water pressure changes and earthquake 
loading, and there have been numerous past studies on 
landslides in these materials [10-12].  
Figure 4: Main areas affected by landslides, liquefaction and lateral spreading, and surface fault rupture. The isoseismals 
(Modified Mercalli Intensity, MMI) are taken from the USGS Shake Map [3]. Strong motion stations locations are taken 
from KiK-NET and K-NET [6]. The peak horizontal (H; single component) and vertical (V) ground accelerations (units are 
in g) shown are for the main Mw 7.0 earthquake on the 16 April 2016. The values are taken from the KiK-NET and K-NET 




The area affected by the earthquake sequence can be broadly 
split into three zones based on their contrasting geomorphology 
(Figure 1):  
a Inner caldera – comprising a series of active volcanic vents. 
The slopes in this area range from gentle angles (<10 degrees) 
on the lower slopes, to very steep (>60 degrees) upslope 
towards the vents. The gentler lower slopes are mantled in 
volcanic soils (including pumice), which can be many metres 
thick and underlain by pyroclastic deposits (ignimbrites) and 
lava flows. The upper slopes are typically formed in rock (lavas 
and ignimbrites) with a shallow (up to 10 metres thick) mantle 
of volcanic soil. 
b Shirakawa River valley – comprising a narrow break in the 
surrounding caldera outer wall on the south-western side, 
through which the Shirakawa River flows. The Futagawa Fault 
passes through this valley. The river has incised through the 
volcanic rocks forming a steep-sided gorge (up to 70 m in 
height) where it flows out from the caldera wall. The slopes on 
the southern side of the river are typically steep (>30 degrees to 
vertical) and formed in rock with a thin mantle of volcanic soil. 
The northern slopes comprise relatively gentle (5 to 20 degrees) 
alluvial terraces, slightly steeper fans (fluvial/debris flow) and 
steeper rock slopes (typically > 30 degrees slope).     
c Outer caldera and alluvial plains – the caldera rim comprises 
a series of steep (> 30 degrees) “scarp slopes” formed of rock 
with a thin mantle of volcanic soil, on the eastern side. The 
“dip” slopes on the western side of the rim are much gentler (< 
30 degrees) formed mainly in deep volcanic soils. Further west 
towards Mashiki Township and Kumamoto City, the slopes 
become relatively flat, and are formed mainly in alluvium. 
 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE EARTHQUAKE 
EFEFCTS 
At the time of writing this report, the total number of reported 
deaths is 69, although some people are still missing. Based on 
newspaper reports, at least 10 of these deaths can be related to 
four landslides that are thought to have been triggered by the 
main earthquake on 16 April 2016 [13]. 
Damage to residential houses ranged from no damage in areas 
of low shaking or where houses had been recently constructed, 
to complete collapse, especially of the older traditional one-
storey or two-storey timber houses, in the areas of strong 
shaking and surface fault rupture. Houses were also severely 
damaged or had been destroyed by a number of major landslides 
in the Mt. Aso volcanic caldera and on the slopes forming the 
caldera outer walls. Away from the areas close to the fault 
rupture, the heavy tiled roofs of houses appear to have been 
damaged by shaking, and were observed to have been protected 
with blue plastic sheets. In total several thousand residential 
houses were reported to have either been partially damaged or 
collapsed [14]. Mashiki Town appeared to be the worst-affected 
area.  
The earthquake-induced shaking and landslides also caused 
considerable damage to roads, highways, rail transportation, 
linear infrastructure (pipes and cables) and high voltage 
transmission lines. Several bridges, including the critical Aso 
Ohashi Bridge, were completely destroyed or were significantly 
damaged by landslides.  
Rupture along the main fault was mapped at the surface over 
several kilometres, from Mashiki Town (to the West) to Minami 
Aso Village (to the East), as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 5: Three-component acceleration records measured at KMMH016 (Mashiki) and KMM006 








Many residents of Nishihara Village were evacuated over fears 
that the nearby Ookirihata earth-dam, damaged by fault rupture, 
could breach.  
In a few suburbs of Kumamoto City and in Mashiki Town, 
localised liquefaction took place, causing lateral spreading, 
differential settlements of the ground and riverbanks, sinking 
and tilting of buildings, foundation failures, cracks on roads, 
and disruption of water and sewage pipe networks. The overall 
effects from liquefaction related hazards appeared relatively 
minor compared to the damage caused by shaking, landslides 
and surface fault rupture. The report prepared by GEER [15] 
considers the liquefaction effects in some detail and concludes: 
“Surprisingly, given the intense ground motions, liquefaction 
occurred only in a few districts of Kumamoto City and in the 
port areas, indicating that the volcanic soils were less 
susceptible to liquefaction than expected given the intensity of 
earthquake shaking, a significant finding from this event that 
needs to be evaluated in future research.” 
The type of observed earthquake hazard typically varies 
between the areas, although there are some similarities between 
the areas with regards to damage to buildings and retaining wall 
collapse.   
In areas a and b, the main types of hazard were landslides and 
surface fault rupture. These landslides mainly comprised earth 
flows and slides, debris flows and avalanches, earth/debris 
slides and slumps. Landslides in area a are reported to have 
killed at least 10 people out of the 69 confirmed deaths 
associated with the earthquake. In area c, the dominant ground-
damage hazards were liquefaction, settlement and lateral 
spreading. Effects from the surface fault rupture (severe 
permanent ground displacement and strong shaking) were 
evident in all three areas, in a narrow corridor each side of the 
surface rupture. 
The following sections provide more detailed descriptions of 
the types of ground failures that were observed during the 
reconnaissance mission. 
GROUND SHAKING AND BUILDING DAMAGE 
It was apparent that severe ground shaking caused significant 
damage to buildings in the epicentral area and along the fault 
rupture corridor. Many houses and other buildings either on or 
adjacent to the surface fault rupture or projected fault trace were 
severely damaged as a result of both the strong ground shaking 
and permanent ground displacement.  
The most common form of damage was to the tiled roofs of 
residential houses and buildings. Such damage extended further 
out from the immediate epicentral area. In many locations, blue 
plastic sheets had been used to cover damaged roofs, and were 
a common sight across the area, see Photo 1. 
Most of the buildings appeared to have collapsed due to the 
strong ground shaking caused by the action of the inertia forces 
on the heavy roofs (Photo 2). Collapsed buildings were mostly 
old wooden one- and two-storey houses. The roofs of these 
houses were typically formed from “kawara” tiles, which were 
intentionally made to be heavy, in order to prevent them from 
“flying away” during typhoons. The Kumamoto district is one 
of worst typhoon disaster areas in Japan. It is also possible that 
deterioration of the structural members could have occurred as 
a result of insect damage. 
Observations indicate that the lack of adequate bracing had 
contributed to this damage, as the houses appeared to have 
collapsed from rocking of the building during strong ground 
shaking. More modern houses appear to have been damaged 
and collapsed due to the presence of soft storeys, with garages 
in the lower storey. 
Detailed inspection of this damage was not the focus of this 
team, however, the combination of heavy (tiled) roofs, lack of 
bracing and soft storeys appeared to have contributed to the 
damage and collapse of a number of these houses in the 
epicentral region.   
Approximately 49 people were killed by collapse of houses 
[13]; most of these deaths were in private houses rather than 
concentrated in any particular building, although there were two 
cases where multiple deaths occurred in the same building.  
FAULT RUPTURE 
Fault rupture was observed in many locations by the team. 
Evidence of surface rupture (cracking) was able to be traced 
over a distance of many kilometres, from Mashiki Town, 
around and through Kurokawa Village and all the way to Aso 
City (Figure 4). The GEER report [15] contains extensive 






Photo 1: Typical blue sheets covering damaged roofs in close proximity to the surface fault rupture (Location 22 in 





Where fault related cracks pass through hard surfaces such as 
roads, lateral displacements (on individual cracks) were 
observed in the order of up to 0.1 m, with cumulative 
displacements of up to 1.5 m. Fault rupture of up to 2 m lateral 
displacements was observed in rice fields in area c, on the outer 
caldera slopes (Photo 3). Major fault rupture hazard types 
observed during the reconnaissance are described henceforth. 
 
 
Photo 3: Fault rupture of 1.8 m lateral displacements 
observed in rice fields in Mashiki Town (location 22 in 
Figure 2: N 32.80487; E 130.8593) 
 
 
Photo 4: Surface fault rupture at the Ookirihata earth dam 
in Nishihara Village (Location 23 in Figure 2: N 32.8415; E 
130.9321). 
 
In Nishihara Village severe damage to the left hand side wall of 
the spillway of the Ookirihata earth dam and adjacent highway 
over dam crest were observed (Photo 4). No other damage was 
apparent to the team on the earth dam, but the dam has been 
drawn down following the earthquake. The GEER team [15] 
investigated this dam in detail and identified additional fault 
related damage. 
In Minami Aso severe damage and collapse of houses adjacent 
to the fault trace was observed (Photo 5). Fault displacement of 




Photo 5:  Collapsed apartment block located on the fault 
rupture in Kurokawa, Minami Aso Village (Location 17 in 
Figure 2: N 32.8852; E 130.9943). 
LANDSLIDES 
Distribution of landslides 
According to local residents, nearly all the landslides in areas a 
and b were triggered by the Mw 7.0 earthquake on 16 April 
2016. This occurred at 01:25 am, when most people would have 
been asleep. The main area affected by landslides measures 
about 110 km2. Figure 7 shows a plot of those areas affected by 
landslides triggered in similar magnitude earthquakes in New 
Zealand. Such relationships are only indicative, however, as the 
areas affected by landslides (triggered by strong ground 
Photo 2: Low damage to a new residential house (without tiled roof) and severe damage to two-storey timber 
house (with heavy tiled roof) observed in Mashiki Town (N 32.7876; E 130.8185) 
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shaking) can often be limited by the lack of steep topography 
on which landslides could occur.  
The preliminary landslide mapping carried out by the PASCO 
Geospatial Group [16] has identified more than 280 landslides 
within the main area affected by landslides shown in Figure 4. 
This gives a landslide density of about 2.5 landslides per km2 
inside this area, which corresponds to the MMI ≥ 9 zone (Figure 
4), and a landslide density of about 1 landslide per km2 in the 
total area affected by landslides at MMI < 9. This number is 
thought to be a lower estimate of the total number of landslides 
generate by the earthquakes, as the mapping does not cover the 
entire area affected and only the larger landslides – those visible 
from satellite imagery – have been identified. 
A total of 125 landslides have been documented by the Japanese 
authorities [17] as impacting homes and infrastructure. Nearly 
all of these are inside the main area affected by landslides 
shown in Figure 4.  
Types of landslides 
Many landslides and associated cracks were observed in natural 
soil and fill material overlying bedrock, and many were also in 
rock, where only limited soil cover was apparent.  
Cracking, indicative of incipient landsliding, was observed on 
the relatively flat slopes (terraces) behind the sharp convex 
breaks in slope that form the edges of the steeply incised rivers 
and streams. In many areas ground cracks was observed in 
locations where the topography was locally steeper.  
The slopes around the Aso Volcanology Laboratory of Kyoto 
University were extensively cracked, with the cracks extending 
many hundreds of metres across the ridge top. Vertical and 
horizontal permanent ground displacements (indicating back 
tilting and rotational movements) were measured across these 
cracks, suggesting that they were indicative of incipient 
landslides (and ridge-renting). On the steeper slopes at the 
edges of the area of cracking, the amount of permanent ground 
displacement increased, and in some areas the mass had broken 
down to form earth flows.  
In addition to the earth flows, several debris flows also occurred 
on the steep flanks of the volcano. The source areas of these 
debris flows appeared to comprise failures in the volcanic soils 
overlying rock, with the toe of the failure surfaces being 
consistent with rock head. Much of the ground above and 
around these source areas was cracked, with evidence of 
permanent down-slope displacement indicative of incipient 
landslides. The steep debris trails below these source areas 
suggest that flow/avalanche movement mechanisms were 
dominant. Debris avalanches in predominantly weathered rock 
and shallow soil were also observed on the near the crest of the 
steep slopes of the inner caldera. 
The main earthquake-induced landslides observed during the 
reconnaissance were classified into different types (according 
to Hungr et al. [18]), as listed below, and illustrated through 
examples henceforward: 
 Earth flow/slide 
 Debris flow 
 Planar (translational) slide/slump 
 Incipient landslide (cracking) 
 Large debris (rock/soil avalanche) 
 Small to moderate size debris avalanche  
 Rock falls 
Earth flow/slide 
In Minami Aso Village (Location 9 in Figure 2), a mobile earth 
slide (100 m wide by 600 m long; estimated volume between 
60,000 and 100,000 m3) developed into a flow on low angle 
(around 10-15º) slopes, with a travel angle from landslide 
crown to debris toe (Fahrboeschung) of 6–7º (Figure 8b). 
Relatively large intact blocks of soil, grass and trees travelled 
towards the toe of the slope (Photos 6 and 7). Landslides 
travelled in three separate directions from a common source 
(Figure 8a) and destroyed at least 7 houses and killed 5 people 
at the Takanodai Housing complex, threatened many other 
houses, and blocked several roads. 
Tension cracks and scarps (indicative of incipient landsliding) 
above the head scarp adjacent to the Aso Volcanological 
Laboratory were also observed indicating the potential for head 
scarp retrogression.  
As shown in Photo 8, the slide surface was identified and traces 
of orange-coloured pumice soil were clearly noted on it. Two 
small trial pits (Figure 8) were excavated across the assumed 
slide surface and soil profile details are provided henceforward. 
Figure 7: Relationship of the area affected by landslides during historical earthquakes of different magnitudes in 
New Zealand and worldwide. The squares represent the total and main area affected by landslides triggered by the 





Photo 6: Source of earth flow/slide in Minami Aso Village 
(looking downhill), with damaged houses and the large 
debris avalanche at Aso Ohashi Bridge visible in the distance 
(Location 9 in Figure 2: N 32.8851; E 131.0049) 
 
Photo 7: View of the main landslide (looking uphill), with 
the Aso Volcanological Laboratory visible in the distance 
(Location 9 in Figure 2: N 32.8951; E 131.0135) 
 
Figure 8: a) Google Earth image of the earth flow/slide near the Aso Volcanological Laboratory near Kurokawa. 
Location 9 in Figure 2 (No.1: main landslide; No.2-4 minor earth slides; No. 5 cracks; A-A’ cross-section; s: soil 





Photo 8. Traces of pumice soil on the slide surface 
Debris flow 
In Nagano, Minami Aso Village (Locations 13 and 27 in Figure 
2), about four houses were hit and partially flooded by debris. 
More houses are now potentially at risk from subsequent debris 
flows along the channel initiated during rain events. A Sabo-
dam (debris control structure) was damaged by the debris flow 
(Photo 9), one local road bridge was destroyed and another 
inundated by debris. There is likely to be an on-going long term 
impact following further storm events.  
The channelised flow (2.8 km runout distance, impacting on 
300 m by 120 m area in the main debris deposition zone) 
occurred along a steep drainage line, fed by multiple source 
areas on the steeper upper flanks of the volcanic cone high 
above the deeply incised valleys. Typically planar slides and 
rotational slumps developed into flows with debris feeding into 
the main channel (Photo 10 and Figure 9). Cracking, indicative 
of incipient landsliding, was prevalent in the upper reaches of 
catchment above the source areas. Source material was mostly 
volcanic soil. However, several large boulders were apparent in 
the debris, indicating that rock slopes failures in the valleys may 
have contributed to the debris. At the time of the survey, much 
of the debris was still located upslope of the main deposition 
zone, within the main drainage line. The estimated 
Fahrboeschung was about 10–11º (Figure 10). 
 
 
Photo 9: Debris-flow deposits being cleared up (Location 13 
in Figure 2: N 32.8643; E 131.0216) 
 
 
Photo 10: Debris flows sourced from the steep volcanic 
slopes above Kawayo, Minami Aso Village  




Planar (translational) slide/slump 
In Tokyu Country Town, Minami Aso Village (Location 12 in 
Figure 2), a planar slide affected approximately 40 houses 
(Figure 11) and severely damaged access roads and services. 
The slide had an extension of 400 m by 120 m and an estimated 
volume of 400,000 to 600,000 m3 (assuming a depth of between 
8 and 12 m).  
Intact displaced rafts of debris on a low angle slope (about 3º) 
appeared to be translating along rock head. A graben had 
developed at the head scarp, with slumping (rotation) and 
toppling of the debris rafts adjacent to the steeper slopes of the 
stream, near the toe of movement (Figure 12). Cumulative 
lateral displacements were greater than 2.5 m horizontally, 
localised vertical displacement of up to 1 m were recorded 
across some cracks. There is a possibility of on-going 
displacement due to water ingress through cracks and broken 
services. Volcanic soil and subdivision fill overlay the rock. 
Typical damage to houses and land observed in Tokyu Country 










Figure 11.  Google Earth image of the earth slide/slump at 
Tokyu Country Town (Location 12 in Figure 2). This 





Figure 10. Cross-section along the channelised debris flow near Nagano Village (Location 13 on Figure 2). 




Photo 11: Translational slide / slump at Tokyu Country 
Town, Aso. About 40 houses were affected by landslide 
movement (N 32.8796; E 131.0030). 
 
 
Photo 12: Toe area of the translational slide/slump at Tokyu 
Country Town showing the transition from sliding to 
slumping towards stream (N 32.8805; E 131.0025). 
Incipient landslide (cracking) 
As indicated in Figure 13, multiple cracks extending many 
100’s of metres across the ridge crest were observed at the Aso 
Volcanological Laboratory (Location 8 in Figure 2). Crack 
widths varied from a few cm to over 1 m with vertical and 
horizontal displacements apparent. Movement vectors across 
cracks suggested rotation (slumping) towards the north, 
indicative of incipient landslides (ridge-renting). On the steeper 
slopes at the edges of the area of cracking the amount of 
permanent ground displacement increased, and in some areas 
the mass had broken down to form more mobile earth 
flows/slides (Photo 13).  
The Aso Volcanological Laboratory appeared to be damaged 
and had been red placarded. Services and other infrastructure 
crossing the cracks are likely to be severely disrupted. There is 
potential for future landslides to occur from water ingress, 
which could impact on homes below not already damaged. 
As shown by Photo 14, cracking was located also above the 
head scarp of the translational flow/slide adjacent to the Aso 
Volcanological Laboratory, indicating the potential for head 
scarp retrogression.  
  
Figure 13.  Google Earth image of the incipient landsliding at 




Photo 13: Extensive cracking located upslope near the Aso 




Photo 14: A typical cracking located near the scarp of the 
translational slide/slump below the Aso Volcanological 






Large debris (rock/soil avalanche) 
Photo 15 and Figure 14 show the largest avalanche of rock and 
volcanic soil (820 m long by 200 m wide; estimated volume of 
900,000 to 1,000,000 m3, including source area and 
entrainment) caused by the Kumamoto earthquakes. 
The debris overwhelmed and removed the main highway and 
destroyed the Aso Ohashi Bridge across the Shirakawa River 
(Photo 16), including any services on the bridge. One person in 
a car on the bridge at the time of the failure is assumed to have 
been killed although the car and person have not been retrieved. 
This bridge was a lifeline as it provided access for residents of 
Minami Aso and surrounding area to the local hospital and 
Kumamoto City. Loss of the bridge caused major disruption to 
transportation, as transport is limited to a narrow, windy road 
over the caldera rim. 
The source area is located in what appears to be weathered rock 
(regolith) near the crest of a steep and high slope. The debris 
from the source area seems to have entrained colluvium and 
terrace gravels (soil) located below the source. As shown in 
Figure 15, the Fahrboeschung was estimated to be 23º (±2º). 
The debris travelled into the main Shirakawa River, destroying 
the main road bridge, and temporarily blocking the river. The 
debris dam was apparently breached soon after its formation. 
 
 
Photo 15: Debris avalanche at Aso Ohashi Bridge (Location 
10 in Figure 2: N 32.8834; E 130.9896) 
 
Photo 16: Toe of the debris avalanche at Aso Ohashi Bridge. 
Note the bridge has been destroyed by the landslide 
(Location 10 in Figure 2: N 32.8834; E 130.9896). 
 
Small to moderately sized debris avalanches and cracking 
Landslides and cracking extended intermittently for several 
kilometres along the crest of the steep slopes adjacent to the 
Shirakawa River near Toshita Kawayō (Figure 16a). A typical 
cross section is reported in Figure 16b. 
Some failures are joint controlled (columnar jointing) and some 
are confined to the regolith. Cracks with vertical and horizontal 
displacement indicating movement towards the cliff edge 
(indicative of incipient landsliding) were located upslope above 
the debris avalanche head scarps. In some locations the cracks 
had not fully developed into debris avalanches. 
Roads, power lines and other services were severely damaged 
by lateral displacements in the areas of cracking. A bridge deck 
(an alternative route across the Shirakawa River) was 
completely destroyed by one debris avalanche (Photo 17). 
Moreover, the western abutment of another bridge across the 
river (which was still intact) dropped by about 1.5 m vertically, 
making the bridge deck inaccessible to vehicles (Photo 18). The 
damage to these bridges and the Aso Ohashi Bridge mean that 
the main access route to Kumamoto City is now via an 
alternative route that winds up the slopes of the caldera, adding 
approximately two hours of journey time to Kumamoto City.   
Figure 14. Google Earth image of the debris avalanche that destroyed the main road bridge across the Shirakawa River 




Figure 16. a) Google Earth image of the slope adjacent to the Shirakawa River (Location 5 in Figure 2); and b) 
cross-section through the slope. 




Photo 17: Bridge deck destroyed by a relatively small debris 
avalanche (N 32.8752; E 131.9886). 
 
 
Photo 18: Displacement of the road bridge abutment. The 
displacement resulted from loosening and toppling of the of 
the jointed rock mass supporting the abutment foundation 
(N 32.8764; E 131.9827). 
Rock falls 
Near Tochinokibaru hot spring (Locations 14 and 15 in Figure 
2), many rock falls blocked the main road (Photo 19). The 
estimated volume of rock falls was from a few m3 to many 
hundreds of m3. Source material was welded tuff, ignimbrite, 
basaltic lava and lava breccia. 
 
The rock falls sourced from the steep rock slopes above the 
Shirakawa River and main road. The runout was approximately 
70 m, with a Fahrboeschung of about 32º. Many of these slopes 
had been modified by the construction of rock fall mitigation 
measures, comprising shotcrete, mesh and dowels apparent. In 
many locations the shotcrete, concrete grids and mesh had been 
damaged due to rock mass dilation induced by the earthquakes. 
Photo 20 shows the impact of one of the largest rock fall 
encountered during the survey, where a single block crushed 
two cars on the local road below the main road. 
Topographical amplification of shaking 
Cracking (incipient landsliding) and small to moderately sized 
debris avalanches were observed adjacent to the sharp convex 
breaks in slope along the steeply incised Shirakawa River 
valley. Larger debris avalanches, debris flows and associated 
cracking also occurred near the crests of the steeper inner crater 
slopes and the steep upper slopes on Mount Aso volcano. In 
addition, many of the earth flow and slides appeared to have 
developed in the thick volcanic soils overlying rock. In some 
locations their rupture surface appeared to be consistent with 
rock head. 
Many of the landslides in the steep hillsides appear to be located 
near the top of the ridge or terrace, with the debris from these 
failures flowing further down the slope. 
These patterns of ground cracking, the morphology and 
topographic position of the landslide source areas and the 
materials exposed in them, suggest amplification of shaking 
caused by:  
 Localised variations in topography; and 
 Material velocity contrasts, i.e. differences between the 
shear wave velocities of the soils and rock, coupled with the 
rock/soil mass strength. 
These observations suggest that topographical amplification 
effects, exacerbated by the presence of weak soils and 
weathered rock may have been an important factor in the 
triggering of the landslides.  
 
 
Photo 19: Typical rock fall on the road near the 
Tochinokibaru hot spring (N 32.8746; E 131.9884)  
 
 
Photo 20: Cars crushed by rock fall near the Tochinokibaru 
hot spring (N 32.8711; E 131.9982) 
 
Sensitive volcanic soils 
Many of the earthquake-induced earth flow/slides occurred on 
gentle slopes and were highly mobile. Observations of the 
materials forming the identified slide surface of the earth 
flow/slide at the Aso Volcanological Laboratory suggest that 
failure may have occurred in weathered soils derived from 
pyroclastic fall deposits. Two small trial pits were excavated 
across the recognised slide surface by Kyoto University and the 
NZSEE team.  
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Soil exposed in the trial pit and a borehole describing a typical 
soil profile up to the depth of 14 m is reported in Figure 17. The 
soil consists of (1) Kuroboku volcanic ash with organic contents 
(black colour); (2) volcanic ash Akaboku (red/brown colour); 
(3) pumice soil; and (4) soft/weathered rock. Significantly, 
water seepage was clearly observed within the pumice soil 
layer, indicating that the Akaboku ash soil (clay-like soil) is 
much less permeable than the pumice soil. 
It is not known which material initiated the failure, but it is 
possible that the slide surface may have been: i) in a wet thin 
(>10 cm) halloysite pumice layer; ii) in an underlying thin 
(about 10 cm) very wet clay layer; or iii) at the boundary 
between the two. The NZSEE team took block samples of these 




Figure 17: a) Soils exposed in wall of a trial pit excavated in 
the northern flank of the landslide; and b) typical borehole 





The relationship between landslide volume and landslide height 
(H) to length (L) ratio measured from the source crest to debris 
toe (Fahrboeschung) for the Aso Ohashi Bridge debris 
avalanche, Nagano channelised debris flow and the Aso 
Volcanological Laboratory earth slide/flow, have been plotted 
on Figure 18 with similar types of landslides compiled by GNS 
Science from published data sources from around the world. 
The debris avalanche fits with the other debris avalanches 
contained in the data set. The channelised flow also fits with the 
other channelised flows contained in the data set.  
The earth flow/slide at the Aso Volcanological Laboratory plots 
between the 63% and 95% confidence lines fitted to all of the 
plotted data, and is similar to the data from the “strongly 
retrogressive flow slides in sensitive clays” data set. 
 
 
Figure 18: Relationship between landslide volume and 
Fahrboeschung (Landslide height to length ratio, measured 
from the source crest to debris toe). 
Landslide slope height and inclination 
The relationship between slope height and slope inclination for 
the main types of landslide triggered by the Mw 7.0 16 April 
2016 earthquake and discussed in the previous sections, have 
been plotted in Figure 19 against:  
 similar landslides that were triggered during the 2010/11 
Canterbury earthquake sequence; 
 landslides triggered by the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake; and  
 landslides plotted by Keefer [19].  
The data for the large Aso Ohashi Bridge debris avalanche (two 
data points representing the range in the data), plot with the 
similar data from the larger debris avalanches triggered by the 
Wenchuan earthquake. The small to moderate sized debris 
avalanches along Shirakawa River plot at the lower slope angle 
end of the data from debris avalanches triggered by the 2010/11 
Canterbury earthquake sequence, suggesting that the rock mass 
strength is possibly lower than that related to the volcanic rocks 
of the Port Hills. The debris avalanche data from the Kumamoto 
earthquake does show that as slope height increases the volume 
of the debris avalanches produced also increases, which is 
 
 
consistent with the Canterbury and Wenchuan data sets. This is 
possibly due to the larger sizes of landslides mobilised in the 
high slopes, i.e. bigger slopes can produce bigger landslides.  
The data for the large earth flow/slide at the Aso Volcanological 
Laboratory plots above the slope heights of other slides/slumps 
and the toe slumps triggered during the 2010/11 Canterbury 
earthquakes. Although a different type of landslide to the 
Canterbury toe slumps and the Tokyu earth slide/slump, these 
data do show that earthquake-induced landslides can develop 
on relatively gentle slopes, as observed during both the 
Canterbury and Kumamoto earthquakes. 
Future landslides in the area 
Given the nature of the cracked slopes in the main area of 
shaking and the timing of the earthquakes shortly before the 
rainy season, there is a high potential for post-seismic landslides 
to occur. On 20 June 2016, heavy rainfall occurred across the 
prefecture, which triggered extensive landslides and flooding. 
The AGU Landslide Blog reports three deaths and two people 
missing [22]: i) in Kamiamakusa a 92-year-old man was killed 
in his house by a landslide; ii) in Uto two houses were buried, 
leaving one man dead and a woman missing; and iii) in 
Kumamoto city two people were trapped by a landslide in their 
home, one has been confirmed dead and the other is missing. 
Regulatory environment 
As reported by Dang et al. [23], the Kumamoto prefectural 
government had created “landslide hazard maps” based on 
national standards for landslide prevention using the following 
criteria: 1) steep areas at least 5 m high with a slope of 30o or 
more, 2) areas below a rapid mountain stream that has formed 
as alluvial fan, and 3) areas where landslides have occurred or 
are at risk of occurring.  
This law limits where people can build e.g., new houses are not 
allowed to be constructed within a given distance from the toe 
of a dangerous slope. However, if slope angle and height only 
are used to distinguish such slopes, much of the Japanese 
countryside would be incorporated into the hazard maps. By 
including a material type class in the assessment (e.g., volcanic 
soils and other areas where sensitive materials are located), the 
amount of land included could be reduced. 
 
LIQUEFACTION AND LATERAL SPREADING 
Liquefaction and lateral spreading was observed in two areas 
visited by the NZSEE Team: 
 Kumamoto City centre: in the relatively narrow corridor 
between Highway No. 3 and the Kyushu Shinkansen line 
railway; and 
 Mashiki Town. 
A summary of liquefaction characteristics and impact is 
provided henceforward. 
Liquefaction in Kumamoto City 
In Kumamoto City (Locations 2-4 in Figure 2), discrete areas 
of sand boils with ejection of sand indicative of liquefaction at 
shallow depth were observed. They were mostly adjacent to 
power poles (Photo 21) and foundations where the crust has 
been weakened. Localised lateral spreading also took place. 
The impact of liquefaction mainly consisted of differential 
settlement, tilting and damage of residential houses (Photo 22). 
In some cases, depression of buildings into the ground 
suggested the occurrence of foundation failure. 
  
Photo 21: Traces of sand ejection adjacent to power pole in 
Kumamoto City (N 32.7583; E 130.6823) 
 
Figure 19: Relationship between slope height and slope inclination for the main types of landslide triggered by 
the Mw 7.0 16th April 2016 earthquake, plotted against the relevant landslides that were triggered during the 




Photo 22: Liquefaction-induced tilting of two residential 
buildings in Kumamoto City (N 32.7600; E 130.6829) 
 
Liquefaction in Mashiki Town 
In Mashiki Town (Locations 19-21 in Figure 2), extensive 
subsidence and localised lateral displacement of the ground 
indicated the occurrence of liquefaction. Differential 
settlement, tilting and severe damage to residential houses as 
well as cracking of roads, kerbs and land were also common. 
However, liquefaction surface expression were limited perhaps 
due to the depth of the liquefiable layer being overlain by a crust 
of liquefaction resistant soils.  
Few sand boils were also seen; however, these appeared to be 
limited to only some areas affected by liquefaction. The limited 
ejecta were observed to consist of coarse sand. The area 
appeared to have been developed from a previous paddy (rice) 
farming field, and with extensive drainage measures in place. 
The subsidence has led to the potential for flooding, and the 
banks of the drainage channels along the residential areas had 
been raised using soil filled polyester bags wrapped with 
polythene as a temporary flood protection measure (Photo 23).  
 
 
Photo 23:  Temporary flood protection measure to mitigate 
the impact of liquefaction-induced subsidence of river bank 
in Mashiki Town (N 32.7832; E 130.8084) 
 
Temporary repair to roads were typically observed in the areas 
affected by cracking, lateral displacement (near adjacent 
waterways or gentle slopes) and settlement of roads (Photo 24), 
and protrusion of manholes. Ramps up to bridges were built to 
remediate differential movement between apparently piled 
bridges and unsupported embankments. Besides, provisional 
portaloos and sewage pumping trucks were used to overcome 
damage to drainage and sewerage systems.  
 
 
Photo 24:  Cracking, lateral displacement and tilting of 
power lines induced by lateral spreading in Mashiki Town 
(N 32.7860; E 130.8177) 
 
PERFORMANCE OF BUILT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Observations of damage 
The observations of the team were dominated by buildings and 
infrastructure damage caused by:  
 Permanent ground displacement in response to surface fault 
rupture in a narrow strip of ground either side of where the 
fault ruptured at the surface;  
 Strong ground shaking confined to an area either side of the 
surface fault rupture; 
 Landslides and slope cracking (incipient landslides), 
triggered by the earthquakes; 
 Retaining wall failures (local and global) and their 
performance; 
 Bridge and road collapses (triggered by landslides); 
 Liquefaction and lateral spreading leading to localized 
damage in areas of alluvium around Mashiki and 
Kumamoto City (area c). 
Residential housing 
The earthquakes are understood to have caused the following 
impact on residential houses in the Kumamoto Prefecture [14], 
which had about 315,000 houses (as of 20 May 2016): 
 Total 96,421 houses were affected (damaged); 
 Fully collapsed – 7,994; 
 Partially collapsed – 17,818; 
 Slightly damaged – 70,609; 
 The remainder with minor damage. 
The damage was caused by a combination of: 
a) Strong ground shaking in the epicentral area, 
b) Liquefaction and associated subsidence, lateral 
spreading and foundation failure, and 






The main observed impacts were on: 
 Transportation routes, as bridges were destroyed and 
damaged by landslides and ground shaking, and in some 
locations road carriageways had been removed and/or 
severely cracked by landslides;  
 Hospital – where access was severely limited due to the 
collapse of a bridge impacted by a landslide and destruction 
of the adjoining roads; also, threatened by debris flow; 
 Power lines – temporary high voltage (66kV) pylons and 
repairs were observed; and  
 Drainage and water services – severely impacted in a 
narrow strip of ground either side of where the fault 
ruptured at the surface and in the areas affected by 
liquefaction and lateral spreading. 
As illustrated by Figure 20, A lot of critical infrastructure 
(major roads and bridges, railway line, hospital, high voltage 
transmission lines and a dam site) was concentrated along the 
main Shirakawa River valley at the natural break in the slopes 
forming the outer crater (locations 5, 6, 7, 10, 15 and 17 in 
Figure 2). Multiple hazards occurred in this area as a result of 
the earthquakes, mainly active faulting and landslides, and as a 
result the main bridges and power lines across the river were 
destroyed. The Asotateno Hospital may have to close as it is 
now too far for people to travel to from inside the crater. The 
hospital was the main one for people living in Aso. 
Retaining walls 
Retaining walls are extensively used to support roads, slopes 
above roads and housing platforms in the epicentral area subject 
to damage.   
The types of retaining walls observed were: 
 Reinforced concrete walls, 
 Unreinforced (typically) concrete facing of slopes, 
 Reinforced earth walls,  
 Tied-back retaining wall with expanded polystyrene (EPS) 
lightweight backfill (two locations), and 
 Gravity boulder walls. 
Figure 20: Location of critical infrastructure concentrated along the main Shirakawa River valley at the natural break 
in the slopes forming the outer crater. Multiple hazards occurred in this area as a result of the earthquakes, active 
faulting and landslides, and as a result the main bridges were destroyed and power transmission lines across the river 
required interim replacement. 
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Types of damage observed in retaining walls are described 
henceforward. 
Unreinforced (typically) concrete facing walls 
Collapse of numerous unreinforced concrete walls was 
observed (Photos 25 and 26). Most of the damaged walls had a 
height between 2 m and 4 m. Their failure induced cracking and 
displacement of ground supported, sometimes leading to 
undermining and tilting of houses.  
 
 
Photo 25: Collapse of a typical unreinforced wall in 
Nishihara Village (N 32.8056; E 130.8583). 
 
 
Photo 26: Fault rupture-induced collapse of a concrete 
facing unreinforced wall near the Ookirihata earth dam in 
Nishihara Village (N 32.8413; E 130.9317). 
 
Reinforced and unreinforced concrete walls 
Complete collapse of reinforced and unreinforced concrete 
walls (1 m to 4 m high) was common in the area affected by 
fault rupture and strong ground shaking (Photo 27). Some of the 
failures led to undermining and tilting of houses or caused the 
partial or full closure of roads due to collapse of one or 
sometimes both lanes of road. 
Displacement of the wall was also common, causing cracking 
of the ground behind. Photo 28 shows the displacement of the 




Photo 27: Complete collapse of a typical unreinforced 




Photo 28: Displacement of the upper part of a wall along 
construction joint (N 32.8843; E 130.9916). 
 
Reinforced earth wall  
The total collapse of a reinforced earth wall (6 m to 10 m high) 
along part of its length (Photo 29) was observed near Tokyu 
Country Town. Pulled out reinforcement strips were visible, 
and possibly the global failure extended beyond reinforced 
blocks. The wall was supporting a road that lost at least one lane 
(Photo 30), leading to realignment of the road uphill.   
 
 
Photo 29: Total collapse of a reinforced earth wall near 




Photo 30: Effects of the collapse of the reinforced earth wall 
(shown in Figure 29) on the supported road (N 32.8804; E 
131.0040). 
 
Tied-back retaining walls with EPS backfill 
A tied-back wall (8 m high) with steel soldiers and a single row 
of small diameter anchors, apparently with expanded 
polystyrene (EPS) backfill, appeared to have performed well 
despite numerous boulders had landed on the road supported by 
it (Photos 31 and 32). 
 
 
Photo 31: Good performance of a tied-back retaining wall 
with EPS backfill (N 32.8711; E 130.9916). 
 
 
Photo 32: Road above the tied-back retaining wall (shown in 
Photo 31) closed by rock fall (N 32.8714; E 130.9924). 
 
Retaining wall with EPS block backfill 
Photo 33 shows a concrete facing wall with EPS block backfill 
(3m to 5m high) that was built to form a road embankment near 
the Asotateno Hospital. The wall appeared to have overall 
performed well with some cracking along the road, and 
cracking and failure of some wall panels. However, as 
illustrated by Photo 34, the road was closed by a landslide 




Photo 33: Good performance of a retaining wall with EPS 
block backfill (N 32.8792; E 130.9833). 
 
 
Photo 34: Some cracking appeared on the road supported by 
the walls shown in Photo 33 (N 32.8792; E 130.9833). 
Bridges and approaches 
Types of damage observed by the NZSEE team for bridges and 
approaches in liquefaction areas and mountainous areas are 
described hereafter. 
Short span concrete bridges in Mashiki Town 
In Mashiki Town, settlement of approaches of short span 
concrete bridges were often observed (Photo 35), leading to 
temporary ramps being formed to provide access (Photo 36). 
Such bad approach performance can be associated with 
liquefaction-induced settlement of the riverbank showed in 
Photo 23. 
 In the same area, a two span bridge was observed to have 
jumped 300 mm laterally off its bearings (Photos 37 and 38). In 
such a case it is believed that this was the effect of combined 
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Photo 35: Typical settlement of short span concrete bridge 




Photo 36: Temporary ramp being formed to provide access 
due to settlement of short span concrete bridge approaches 
(N 32.7830; E 130.8085). 
 
 
Photo 37: A two span bridge jumped 300 mm laterally off its 
bearings (view from the road) (N 32.7864; E 130.8186). 
 
Photo 38: A two span bridge jumped 300 mm laterally off its 
bearings (view of the bearing) (N 32.7864; E 130.8186)  
 
Long span steel girder bridge in Mashiki Town 
In the liquefied area of Mashiki Town, ground settlement 
around bridge piers was observed (Photo 39), but this did not 
affect the performance of long span steel girder bridges. The 
bridge, however, appeared to have jumped off its bearings. This 
led to local buckling of the bottom web of the girders. The 
girders were re-levelled temporarily with steel plates either side 
of original bearings (Photo 40). Moreover, punching of the ends 
of the I-shape girders into the abutment wall caused shearing of 
back wall (Photo 41). 
 
 
Photo 39: Ground settlement around piers of a long span 





Photo 40: Local buckling of girder bottom. The girders were 
re-levelled temporarily with steel plates either side of original 
bearings (N 32.7790; E 130.7939). 
 
 
Photo 41: Punching of I-shape girder ends into the abutment 
wall caused shearing of back wall (N 32.7789; E 130.7943). 
 
Bridges in mountainous areas (geotechnical effects) 
In many cases, landslides caused the collapse of a number of 
bridge decks (Photo 42 and 43). Some of the bridges were 
reinforced concrete and others were steel arch bridges. 
 
 
Photo 42: Landslides caused the collapse of a number of 
bridges in the mountainous areas of Mt. Aso volcanic 
caldera (N 32.8834; E 130.9896). 
 
Photo 43: Landslides caused also the collapse of bridge 
decks in the mountainous areas of Mt. Aso volcanic caldera 
(N 32.8752; E 131.9886). See also Photo 17. 
 
Abutment foundation failure (Photo 44) and severe disruption 
to approach embankment of one bridge (Photo 45) were caused 




Photo 44: Abutment foundation failure due to the collapse of 
underlain columnar jointed bedrock (N 32.8770; E 
130.9840). See also Photo 18. 
 
 
Photo 45: Severe disruption to approach embankment due to 
the collapse of underlain columnar jointed bedrock (N 




Bridges in mountainous areas (structural performance) 
In the mountainous areas of Mt. Aso volcanic caldera near the 
fault rupture corridor, large vertical and horizontal 
accelerations also had adverse effects of bridge performance.  
For example, the connection of the retrofitted damper of steel 
arch bridge failed at one abutment, and damper buckled at other 
abutment (Photo 46).  
A curved steel arch bridge jumped laterally off bearings – up to 
1.0 to 1.5 m. (Photo 47). Fortunately the pier heads were wide 
and strong enough to accommodate the translation of the deck 
of the 260 m long bridge. 
 
 
Photo 46: Connection of a retrofitted damper of steel arch 
bridge failed at one abutment (N 32.8779; E 130.9094).  
 
 
Photo 47: A curved steel arch bridge jumped laterally off 
bearings (N 32.8426; E 130.9272).  
 
Expressway embankment and retaining walls 
In Mashiki Town, a retaining wall supporting an expressway 
embankment failed along a major drainage channel, removing 
two lanes of the expressway, and closing the adjacent bridge.  
The wall was being reconstructed at the time of the site visit 
using gravel filled polyester bags (Photos 48). 
Expressway on embankment over low lying area suffered 
differential settlement which was particularly evident where the 
road passed over underpasses. Less settlement occurred at the 
structures than at the adjoining fill (Photo 49). 
 
 
Photo 48: Collapse of a retaining wall supporting an 
expressway embankment. Gravel filled polyester bags were 
used to quickly rebuild the wall and reopen the expressway 
(N 32.7792; E 130.7943).  
 
 
Photo 49: Settlement of expressway on embankment (N 




Ookirihata earth dam in Nishihara Village 
In Nishihara Village, fault rupture damaged the spillway of the 
Ookirihata earth dam. The earth dam appeared to be relatively 
undamaged (Photos 50 and 51) 
The reservoir was drawn down as a precaution and the village 
was evacuated immediately after the earthquake given the threat 
of dam break and flooding. 
 
 
Photo 50: Fault rupture damaged the spillway of the 




Photo 51: Close up of the damaged spillway of the 
Ookirihata earth dam (N 32.8414; E 130.9317).  
New dam construction across the Shirakawa River valley 
In the Shirakawa River valley, the collapse of right abutment 
area destroyed the site access of a new dam and inundated 
construction equipment and infrastructure. Such damage is due 
possibly to fault rupture (Photo 52). At the time of the survey, 
remotely-controlled machines were used to clear up the site and 
rescue buried construction equipment in safety (Photos 53).  
 
 
Photo 52: New dam construction site destroyed by fault 
rupture (N 32.8776; E 130.9764). See also Figure 20. 
 
 
Photo 53: Remotely-controlled machines used to rescue 
buried construction equipment (N 32.8776; E 130.9764).  
 
SOCIAL IMPACT 
Sixty-nine people are reported to have been killed by the 
Kumamoto earthquakes [13]. Nine people died in the 
earthquakes on 14 April 2016 and the rest in the main 
earthquake on 16 April 2016. The nine deaths on 14 April 2016 
are reported to have been caused by building collapses. A total 
of 1,679 people are reported to have been injured and one is 
missing. Of the 69 people killed, 49 deaths were caused 
“directly” by the earthquakes; 20 deaths following the 
earthquakes, due to injuries sustained during the earthquakes 
and from post-traumatic stress. 
According to a preliminary report by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan [17], of the 49 
deaths caused “directly” by the earthquakes, nine deaths were 
caused by landslides and their deaths are recorded as being from 
“asphyxiation” as they were buried alive. The missing person is 
also thought to have died due to a landslide as she was travelling 
on the Aso Ohashi Bridge, when it was hit by the debris 
avalanche, which caused it to collapse. The other 40 deaths 
were as a result of being crushed due to collapse of the buildings 
they were in. 
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Of the 20 people that died following the earthquakes, it has been 
reported that some of these deaths were due to deep-vein 
thrombosis, affecting people in the evacuation shelters. This is 
reported to have been a result of the limited physical space in 
these shelters. The Japanese Government is currently assessing 
each individual death to establish the causes. 
KEY FINDINGS 
Key findings from the NZSEE “Learning From Earthquakes” 
Mission to Kumamoto are as follows: 
1. Engineering designed structures generally performed very 
well under moderately severe shaking, when not subjected 
to ground damage effects.  
2. Severe building damage was concentrated relatively close 
to where the fault ruptured at the surface or along the 
projected fault plane.  
3. Compared to liquefaction, which was a major feature of the 
Canterbury Earthquakes, the Kumamoto Earthquakes 
illustrated additional dominant hazards, such as landslides, 
ground shaking and fault rupture. 
4. Landslides on steep slopes have failed in the upper parts of 
slopes, and this may be due to contribution from 
topographical amplification effects and the presence of 
weak soil / rock, leading to enhanced ground shaking. 
5. Relatively gentle slopes can fail in earthquakes when 
underlain by weak and potentially sensitive soil (volcanic 
ash and pumice). 
6. The hilltop cracking observed at the Aso Volcanological 
Laboratory may have been triggered by local site effects 
leading to amplification of shaking, possibly due to material 
contrast (shear wave velocity) and topography. 
7. Rock slopes that perform well statically can fail in 
earthquakes, and lead to loss of support for structures 
founded on them.  Dynamic performance of the rock slopes 
should be assessed considering the combined effects of 
ground shaking and the presence of rock defects and the 
rock mass characteristics. 
8. Even small landslides / rock fall can lead to significant 
effects of the infrastructure, for example where the viaduct 
had its abutment undermined by slope failures, taking out 
the whole route. 
9. Rainfall and wet conditions can lead to an exacerbation of 
the potential effects of landslides, both directly during an 
earthquake, and for a considerable period afterwards. There 
have already been three reported deaths and two people 
missing as a result of landslides triggered by rain in the 
region following the earthquake sequence. 
10. Extreme load cases can cause failure of otherwise well-built 
structures. Examples include landslides on bridges causing 
catastrophic collapse, and landsliding undermining or 
engulfing well designed residential development. 
11. Large vertical accelerations can have an adverse effect of 
structures which rely on gravity to restrain structures – 
bridges “jumping” off bearings. Fortunately the pier heads 
were wide and strong enough to accommodate the 
translation of the deck of a 260 m long curved steel girder 
bridge. 
12. Unreinforced concrete facings on cut soil slopes performed 
well, except where the ground behind or beneath them was 
unstable and failed. Once the facing starts to move 
differently from the soil behind, loose drainage gravel 
behind it can drop down, wedging or jacking the facing out 
of alignment. 
13. Site selection for urban development and route selection for 
critical infrastructure requires the identification of all 
potential geo-hazards, well beyond the immediate vicinity 
– for example Aso Ohashi Bridge, new dam construction 
site. 
14. A lot of critical infrastructure (major roads and bridges, 
railway line, hospital, high voltage transmission lines and a 
dam site) was concentrated along the main river valley at 
the natural break in the slopes forming the outer crater. 
Multiple hazards occurred in this area as a result of the 
earthquakes, which effectively “cut off” people in the towns 
of Minami Aso and Aso from Kumamoto City. Access is 
now via local (minor) roads.  
15. Benched cut slopes performed well compared to the 
surrounding slopes in a quarry. 
16. Emergency flood protection can be achieved using soil 
filled bags wrapped in polyester, where liquefaction had led 
to subsidence. 
17. Use of soil or gravel filled bags allows rapid and effective 
emergency slope repairs. 
18. Underground utilities damaged by the earthquake were not 
being restored at the time of the visit one month after the 
earthquakes, because there was uncertainty about the future 
of some areas. 
19. Liquefaction did not have significant surface expression in 
Mashiki Town, but the consequent subsidence and 
displacements led to significant damage. This is potentially 
due to the presence of a liquefaction resistant layer at the 
surface, but also, possibly due to increased liquefaction 
resistance of volcanically sourced alluvial deposits. 
RELEVANCE FOR NEW ZEALAND  
The observations made by the NZSEE team and their relevance 
to NZ are discussed below: 
1. In general, the older houses with poor bracing performed 
worse than the newer ones.  
2. Heavy tiled roofs led to poor performance, and while these 
are not common in some parts of New Zealand, they are still 
widely used in some areas. 
3. Soft storeys performed poorly and this lesson from previous 
earthquakes was reinforced by observations in this 
earthquake. 
4. About 10% of the total population were temporarily 
evacuated from those areas most affected by strong shaking, 
surface fault rupture and landslides. How would NZ cope 
with such an impact in e.g. Wellington?  
5. There did not appear to be an obvious link between 
geohazard assessments being used to inform the locating of 
critical infrastructure (lifelines). 
6. Land use planning should consider the potential effects of 
all natural hazards including earthquake effects. 
7. Building on alluvial fans potentially introduces a risk to 
development from debris flow hazards in earthquakes, not 
only from extraordinary storm events. 
8. A large proportion of those killed (at least 10) were from 
landslides. Many of the slopes are now cracked and there is 
an increase in the susceptibility of these cracked slopes to 
future failure in rain and/or earthquakes, and has led to 
further deaths. How would NZ deal with this?  
9. At least two of the catastrophic landslides were on slopes 
that had not been identified as hazardous. It is important to 
 
 
consider the potential for landsliding even in gentle slopes, 
where such slopes are underlain by sensitive materials. For 
example, earthflows triggered by the 16th April 2016, 
earthquake were on slopes with angles of about 10-15º.  
10. The volcanic soils in the earthquake performed poorly and 
led to failure of gentle slopes.  A better understanding is 
required to consider the performance of New Zealand’s 
volcanic soils in earthquakes – say in Tauranga and the 
wider Volcanic Plateau and Taranaki which have sensitive 
ash deposits. 
11. Unlike Japan, NZ does not currently carry out systematic 
hazard mapping to identify areas of potential landsliding.  
12. Planning for post-liquefaction subsidence must consider 
effects on increased potential for flooding and the response 
to it. We have seen this effect in Christchurch. 
13. Vertically unrestrained bridge structures can be 
dramatically affected by extreme vertical accelerations. It 
may be appropriate to review current guidance on dealing 
with this load case. 
14. Earthquakes cause many hazards, and while liquefaction 
was a dominant hazard in Christchurch, it is not necessarily 
the case in all areas. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
ENGINEERING PRACTICE 
The team suggests the following areas where further research 
or development of formal guidance is warranted: 
 Encourage early involvement of appropriately experienced 
geo-professionals, as part of a multi-disciplinary team, in 
field visits and the selection of sites and routes for 
development of engineering projects. 
 Review current guidance on site selection for development 
and major projects (e.g. Ministry for the Environment, 
Planning for development of land on or close to faults [24]) 
and develop expanded guidance to cover other hazards. 
 Consider applying higher ground motion parameters for 
design close to active faults (need to consider what zone is 
appropriate based on the ground conditions and tectonics). 
 Develop guidance for taking into consideration vertical 
ground acceleration in design and detailing. 
 Research into the earthquake behaviour of sensitive/ 
unusual soils, including the liquefaction susceptibility of 
volcanically derived soils. 
 Research into topographic amplification effects and 
guidance for design. 
We are aware that some of these areas are already being 
investigated. Our observations from Kumamoto have 
confirmed the relevance and urgency of this work. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Successful siting and design of resilient infrastructure requires 
the integrated effort of multi-disciplinary teams from an early 
stage, and should include geotechnical professionals, so that the 
hazards are identified to influence the design decisions. 
Hazards originating well beyond a particular site can exceed 
design loadings or completely overwhelm buildings and 
infrastructure. The project team therefore, should look beyond 
the boundaries of the site. 
A holistic approach from an early stage is essential to achieve 
resilient infrastructure, making sensible choices that take into 
consideration the wider environment and the uncertainty in the 
magnitude of hazards. As the design load cases could be 
exceeded, it is important to consider how the design can be 
tailored to ensure that the structure still performs in an 
acceptable manner to achieve resilience.  
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